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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the District Court erred in granting Petitioner's Writ of Prohibition? 
a. SBWC failed to show SFD did not have jurisdiction to order SBWC to 
comply with the International Fire Code. 
b. SBWC had an adequate remedy at law through the administrative process and 
judicial review. 
2. Did the District Court erred in the award of attorney fees and costs to 
SWBC? 
a. SFD actions were reasonable interpretation of the International 
Fire Code and Idaho Law. 
b. Attorney's fees should not have been awarded outside the case at 
hand. 
3. Should Appellant be awarded Attorney fees and costs pursuant to LC. 12 -
11 7? 
a. The attorney fees should be awarded to SFD upon the reversal of 
the District Court's decision. 
I I / 
ST A TEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES 
This case was brought before this Court by a Petition for Declaratory Ruling, Petition for a 
Preemptory Writ, and a Petition for Alternative Writ by The Schweitzer Basin Water Company 
(SWBC), through their attorney of record, Stephen Smith,1 against the Schweitzer Fire District 
(SFD) on March 19, 2015without notice of SFD. An Order for Issuance of Alternative Writ of 
Prohibition was issued and received by counsel for SFD on March 20, 2015.2 An Order to Show 
Cause Hearing was set for March 25, 2015. On March 23, 2015, SFD also filed a Motion to 
Dismiss which was not heard during the March 25, 2015 hearing (see Motion to Dismiss).3 
For many years, SBWC and SFD had been discussing the water system, owned and 
managed by the SBWC since 1989.4 Both parties agree that the dispute was in existence since at 
least 1996. 5 After discussions were not productive, the SFD decided to seek counsel and to 
pursue a remedy through administrative channels. The SFD was seeking to improve the safety of 
their residents at Schweitzer by enforcing the International Fire Code that was adopted by the State 
of Idaho in 1982. An Order to Repair and Remedy was sent to the SBWC on May 3, 2014.6 




4 R.p.101 Aff of M. Bailey 
5 R.p.163 Memorandum Decision 
6 R.pp.25 -26 Order demanding Repair .. 
1 
later continued by the SBWC.7 A hearing was finally set for March 20, 2015.8 On the afternoon 
prior to the hearing date the SBWC petitioned the District Comi for relief and for the writs as 
mentioned above.9 
An Order to Show Cause (OSC) date was set within five days and was not in compliance 
with the ten days' notice required prior to the OSC hearing.10 On the date of the OSC hearing the 
SFD hand delivered a Motion to Dismiss predicated on the argument that the writ was improper.11 
The Motion to Dismiss was not heard that day. The alternative writ of prohibition was left in 
place. The parties then entered into mediation with Judge Steve Yerby. Mediation was on-going 
until September 2015 and the proceedings were stayed until mediation was completed. A status 
conference was ultimately set for December 9, 2015 and a renewed Motion to Dismiss was set and 
noticed for that same time. 12 The SBWC added its own motion later and the hearings were 
scheduled to allow time for both parties' motions. On that date, the Judge issued an Order 
Denying the Motion to Dismiss without hearing witnesses or evidence and later issued a written 
order on December 10, 2015 13. Immediately prior to the hearing and the Judge's ruling on the 
Motion to Dismiss, the SFD entered it's Answer to the Petition for Writ of Prohibition, specifically 
7 R.pp .21-24 S. Smith response ltr 
8 R. pp .50-51 
9 R.p.2 Repository 
10 R.p.2. see also IRCP74 
11 R.p.348-351 Motion to Dismiss 
12 R.p.4 Motion to Dismiss 
13 R.p.138-140 Order denying,, 
2 
denying the lack of jurisdiction and the lack of remedy as stated by the Company's Petition 14. 
On January 20, 2016, a hearing on the Writ of Prohibition took place at the Bonner County 
Courthouse. The result of the hearing was the lower court's Memorandum Decision Granting 
Writ of Prohibition dated January 22, 2016.15 Thereafter a contested motion for attorney fees and 
costs culminating with the lower court ordered attorney fees, costs and expenses on March 29, 
2016. 16 A Motion to Reconsider was filed by SBWC contesting their lay persons' time and 
expenses which was subsequently denied. 17 
14 R.p.4 Repository 
15 R.p.162-170 Memorandum Decision 
16 R.p.273-277 Order Awarding Attorney .. 
17 R.p.320-327 Memorandum Decision and Order 
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ARGUMENT 
l. The District Court erred in granting Petitioner's Writ of Prohibition. 
A. SBWC failed to show SFD did not have jurisdiction to order SBWC to comply 
with the International Fire Code. 
Despite the lengthy dealings between the parties and long history this case is a fairly 
straightforward issue for this Court to decide. This case falls within the parameters outlined by 
this Court in Wasden v State Board of Land Commissions, 150 Idaho 547 (2010). In Wasden, this 
Court rejected the Attorney's General's argument a writ of prohibition was necessary due to the 
Board of Lands arguably acting unconstitutionally and outside their mandates. This Court made 
it clear there is a two prong threshold to meet the requirements for the extraordinary remedy of a 
writ of prohibition. The first prong, jurisdiction was not addressed as the Court held that the 
Attorney General could not demonstrate he lacked an adequate remedy at law. SBWC has the 
burden of proof in this matter. It was not SFD's burden to prove jurisdiction to the lower court. 
On the first issue of jurisdiction, the express authority was given to the District by ID APA, 
the Statutes of Idaho, and the International Fire Code adopted by the State of Idaho. This is 
conceded by the SBWC's affiant Mark Larsen with regards to I.C. 41-253 through 41-269 and also 
administrative hearings. 18 
18 SeeRp.124etseq 
4 
Prohibition is not concerned with the correctness of substantive acts and/or decisions -
prohibition is exclusively concerned with proper exercises of jurisdiction. See generally 
Freiburghaus v. Freiburghaus, 100 Idaho 730, 731, 604 P.2d 1209, 1210 (1980) ("The writ of 
prohibition tests only jurisdiction") ( citations omitted). Within the context of prohibition, the word 
"jurisdiction" has a narrow meaning, referring primarily to the "power or authority conferred by 
law." See Henry vs Ysursa,148 Idaho 913 (2008)(citing Crooks v. Maynard, 112 Idaho 312,319, 
732 P.2d 281 , 288 (1987)) (Where administrative orders were within the "power and authority" of 
the administrative district judge, a writ of prohibition would not issue); See also Stein v. Morrison, 
9 Idaho 426,455, 75 P. 246,256 (1904) (quoting and citing with approval Maurer v. Mitchell, 53 
Cal. 289,292 (1878)) ("The wordjurisdiction, when used in connection with prohibition, would be 
at once understood as being employed in the sense of the legal power or authority ' to hear and 
determine cases' "). 
Prohibition is primarily concerned with jurisdiction. See also Bower v. Morden, 126 Idaho 
215, 218, 880 P.2d 245, 248 (1994) ("This Court has consistently held that 'writs of mandate (and 
their counterpart, prohibition) will not issue to compel the performance of a purely discretionary 
function") ( quoting Bopp v. City of Sandpoint, 110 Idaho 488, 490, 716 P.2d 1260, 1262 (1986). 
The language contained in Idaho Code and IDAPA grants express authority to SFD to 
enforce all aspects of the International Fire Code, including the enforcement of fire flows. Recall 
also that jurisdiction has been defined by thi s Court as the "power or authority conferred by law. 
5 
( emphasis added)" See Ysursa, supra19. 
B. SBWC had an adequate remedy at law through the administrative process and 
judicial review. 
The inquiry doesn't end with the determination of jurisdiction. Simply put, even if SFD 
has exceed its jurisdiction as the opposing party states there is still one more hurdle that must be 
met by the SBWC. To be entitled to a writ of prohibition a party must also prove that he or she 
does not have an adequate alternative remedy available in the ordinary course of law. Therefore, 
even if the SBWC prevails on the issue of jurisdiction, they cannot meet their burden regarding the 
adequacy of available remedies. Accordingly, notwithstanding jurisdictional analysis, the lower 
court's decision should be reversed as the issue of an adequate remedy at law was not addressed.20 
As stated, whether or not prohibition is granted hinges on the adequacy of the legal remedies 
available to the pa11y seeking prohibition. More specifically, even though a Court or agency is 
proceeding without or in excess of its jurisdiction, prohibition will not lie so long as there is a 
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available in the ordinary course oflaw. See Wasden. 
The Court wisely disfavors these type writs as it is not difficult to envision smart litigants 
trying to circumvent administrative processes by simply filing a writ in district court. Developers 
who may not like requirements imposed by a City Planning Commission and City Council could 
simply bypass the city altogether. The Supreme Court has been wise not only in issuance of writs 
19 The Amicus Brief fi led by the Attorney General contains a thorough analysis of the issue of jurisdiction. 
20 See R pl67 
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of mandate/prohibition, but also in land use and administrative law to set forth a policy whereby all 
administrative remedies must be exhausted before the doors of the courthouse may be opened. 
In the matter at hand this could not be clearer. In addition, SBWC has the ability to argue 
this matter on the merits to the hearing board first. If one of the parties is not satisfied with the 
decision, it may be appealed to the State Fire Marshal 21. If one of the parties is still not satisfied, 
a petition for judicial review may be filed. At that time the district court will have a Record 
( emphasis added) upon which to make a reasoned decision. Obviously the various rules and 
regulations pertaining to fire flows are complicated and more easily handled by experts or trained 
professionals. It is far more logical for a special hearing board to sort through the history of this 
case and the specific case facts. Idaho Code spells out the appeal process in IC 41-260. It states: 
41-260. APPEAL FROM ORDER OF REMEDY OR REMOVAL -
APPEAL FROM LOCAL APPEAL DECISION. If an order to remedy or remove, 
or a local appeal decision regarding the interpretation of the International Fire Code 
or rules of the state fire marshal, is made by the deputies or assistants of the state 
fire marshal, such owner or occupant who receives the order, or a party aggrieved 
by a local appeal decision, may, within twenty (20) days after receipt of service of 
such order or local appeal decision, appeal to the state fire marshal, who shall 
within ten ( 10) days, review such order or local appeal decision and if affirmed, file 
his decision thereon, and unless by his authority the order or local appeal decision 
is revoked or modified it shall remain in full force and be complied with within the 
time fixed in said order, local appeal decision, or decision of the state fire marshal. 
Provided, however, that any such owner, occupant or party who feels 
himself aggrieved by any such order or local appeal decision, or affirming of such 
order or local appeal decision, may within thirty (30) days after the making or 
affirming of any such order or local appeal decision by the state fire marshal, 
appeal such order or local appeal decision to the district court having jurisdiction of 
the property. 
21 R.p.126, See also IC41-260 
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While there are additional rules found in IDAP A governing contested hearings, timing, 
composition of hearing boards, etc., IC 41-260 demonstrates clearly there is a plain, simple, 
speedy remedy at law available for an aggrieved party who has been ordered by a fire district to 
comply with minimum fire flow standards. Interestingly, the time periods mandated under IC 
4 1-260 are certainly much more speedy than the circuitous route using the writ of prohibition. 
II. The District Court erred in the award of attorney fees and costs. 
A SFD actions were a reasonable interpretation of the International Fire 
Code and Idaho Law. 
Idaho Code Sections 12-121 and 12-1 1 7 form the basis for an award of attorney fees 
against a governmental entity. Attorney fees may be awarded under Idaho Code Section 12-121 if 
the court finds the actions were defended frivolously reasonably or without foundation. In 
addition, Idaho Code 12-117 provides "unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative 
or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county, or other 
taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, 
witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds the party against whom the judgment is 
rendered acted without some reasonable basis in fact or law." 
This Court has declined to award attorney fees, despite the government's erroneous 
interpretation of a statute or ordinance. In Payette River Property Owners Assoc, the Court stated 
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that the Valley County Board of Commissioners erroneously interpreted its ordinance, but 
nevertheless "acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issue." Further, the Court 
quoted from the district court's decision, which stated that the " literal language of§ 4.02.03(6) ( of 
the Valley County Zoning Ordinance) is unambiguous and does not need interpretation or 
construction." Id. at 557, 976 P.2d at 483. The Court stated that to adopt the Board's interpretation 
would require a "stretch of logic unsupported by any section [ of] the Ordinance." Id Despite the 
Board's erroneous interpretation of its unambiguous ordinance, this Court held "that the district 
court did not err by denying the Association's request for attorney fees under I.C. § 12-11 7." Id. at 
558, 976 P.2d at 484_;_ see also Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 361, 2 P.3d 738, 
746(2000) ("Although the Board erred in retroactively applying the 1994 comprehensive plan to 
the Urrutias [sic} subdivision application, the Board did not act without a reasonable basis in fact 
or law. The Board acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the district judge's 
instructions on remand."). 
In Fischer v City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 109 P.3d 1091 (2005), the Supreme Court 
overturned the City ofKetchum's approval of a conditional use permit, stating that the city "wholly 
ignored the provision of its avalanche zone district ordinance requiring the certification by an 
Idaho licensed engineer 'prior to the granting of a conditional use permit. ' "Fischer, 141 Idaho at 
356, 109 P.Jd at 1098. The Court also stated that the city's Planning and Zoning Commission 
"ignored the plain language of the ordinance" in approving the conditional use permit application. 
Id. Based upon this foundation, the Court ordered the city to pay attorney fees. See id. However, 
9 
the Court found that the "City wholly ignored the provision of its avalanche zone district ordinance 
requiring the certification by an Idaho licensed engineer 'prior to the granting of a conditional use 
permit' " and that the City Planning and Zoning Commission "ignored the plain language of the 
ordinance." Id. 
This matter is distinguishable from the Fischer case in that here there is no controlling 
ordinance or statute preventing the actions of the SFD. In fact, the International Fire Code gives 
wide authority to fire districts for the protection of human life, structures and premises. This is 
addressed throughout the amicus brief filed by the Attorney General's Office. The IFC deals with 
many elements of the protection of life and property including the storage of flammable and 
hazardous materials which can be located outside the building or structure. Additionally an 
appendix of the IFC directly addresses hydrants and fire flow22• It was certainly reasonable SFD 
to fight this petition given the expressed language of the IFC, lack of direct negative case law, 
positive case law including, perhaps most importantly, Wasden v Board of Lands. Additionally 
SBWC bore the burden of proof showing no jurisdiction and no adequate remedy at law as 
explained earlier. Had SFD simply conceded there is no jurisdiction it essentially would be a 
message to the home owners of Schweitzer that there is no fire protection available. The 
argument made at various times by SBWC that homeowners should be responsible for maintaining 
adequate fire flows is disingenuous. The SBWC is a public entity and is responsible for the 
integrity of the system including adequate water pressure for fire suppression. 
22 See AG Amicus Brief Exhibit B 
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In Ralph Naylor Farms, LLC v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007), the 
Court looked at an ordinance Latah County had erroneously adopted. The Court reasoned that 
Latah County's actions, while erroneous, were reasonable because provisions of Local Land Use 
Planning Act as well as Latah County's Comprehensive Plan gave the county authority over much 
of the same material that was eventually deemed to be pre-empted by state law. 
In the matter at hand, SFD reasonably relied on strong case law concerning writs of 
mandate/prohibition being extraordinary remedies and not to be granted lightly by courts. The 
district court ruled SFD lacked jurisdiction over the plaintiffs water system. Even assuming 
arguendo the lower court was correct in this interpretation, jurisdiction is an issue which could 
have been addressed through the administrative process. Administrative hearing boards act in a 
quasi-j udicial fashion and an agency must establish whether or not the agency has jurisdiction 
over the applicant, subject property, and case in general. Stated more succinctly, prohibition is 
not concerned with the question of whether or not a substantive decision was, in fact, correct -
prohibition focuses solely on the issue of whether or not the decision in question could even be 
made in the first place. 
11 
Contrary to the affidavit by Mr. Larson there has been an enormous amount of building on 
Schweitzer in the past twenty years.23 , 24 Issues such as fire protection were addressed for the 
conditional use permits, building location permits, site plans, etc. of the various developments. 
SFD would have had direct input on issues such as road slopes, tum arounds, fire suppression for 
all conditional use permits and subdivision plats. SBWC's argument that the IFC applies solely 
to buildings is overly narrow and in fact, not reasonable. Further the communication between 
SFD and SBWC found throughout the Record through the years does not show a pattern of abuse 
of the District. It shows a tacit acknowledgment of the company that this water system not only 
acted as drinking water system but as the fire suppression system as well. Frankly, if SBWC 
didn't want the system to be used for fire suppression they shouldn 't have allowed hydrants to be 
installed and development should not have occurred without an alternative fire suppression 
network. The lower court 's decision calls into question whether SFD is now even able to provide 
fire suppression through existing hydrants using SBWC water. 
The SWBC's argument that the system is grandfathered actually helps the SFD's position 
that jurisdiction exists and/or SFD's interpretation was reasonable.2 5 If this is truly SBWC's 
argument is this not conceding jurisdiction. The Amicus brief presented by the Attorney General 
addresses this issue in greater detail.26 
23 R.p.127 Affidavit of Mark Larson. 
24 R.p.439 Affid avi t of Spencer Newton 
25 R.p.127 Affidavi t of Mark Larson 
26 Amicus Brief, p16 
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Clearly SFD's interpretation of Idaho Statutes when read in p ari materia combined with 
the International Fire Code and the mandate that Fire Districts protect life and property was 
reasonable and the lower court's granting of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 12-11 7 should be 
overturned. 
B. The attorneys fees are unreasonable because they may only be granted for this case. 
Attorney fees were granted commencing with a June 25, 2013, invoice.27 The vast 
majority of the fees granted by the district court pre-date the filing of this case in 201 5. 28 This 
case is the writ of prohibition- it is not any of the prior negotiations, hearings, etc. SBWC simply 
cannot bootstrap attorney fees from the past into this litigation. If SWBC believed the company 
was improperly being harassed by SFD, it should have filed a tort claim or a writ of prohibition 
years ago. There must be a direct nexus between the attorney fees sought and the litigation where 
they are awarded. 
During the pendency of this litigation fees were awarded for thousands of dollars for 
communication with the Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ) and the deputy attorney 
general for the DEQ. This is irrelevant to the issue of jurisdiction of the fire district over fire 
flows. The district has never been concerned with the quality of the drinking water. No threat 
27 See R p234 
28 See R p2 
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has ever been made by the fire district concerning water quality. The fire district has solely 
confined negotiations with the company on the issue of fire flows and fire suppression. 
Additionally fees were awarded for the time in mediation. Mediation costs including 
attorney time and preparation should be borne by the respective parties. This is an extraordinary 
amow1t of money being sought for one legal issue. 
III. Attorneys Fees on Appeal 
The SFD is requesting attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to LC. 12-117. The fire district 
is a governmental entity and was seeking to enforce the IFC, a main function of fire districts. 
SB WC acted without a reasonable basis of fact and law by filing this writ of prohibition. There 
was an adequate remedy at law through the administrative hearing process. SBWC requested an 
administrative hearing 29 and then took an end run around the process and filed the writ with the 
district court. Had SBWC continued with the administrative process the company had layers of 
due process, the first an appeal to the state fire marshal and then judicial review to the district 
court. 
29 See R p31 
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CONCLUSION 
The lower court erred in granting a writ of prohibition on the basis SFD lacked jurisdiction 
over SBWC. The IFC should be construed liberally in conjunction with the statutory scheme 
creating fire districts as well as the adoption by the State ofldaho of the IFC. Writs of Prohibition 
have not been favored by this Court and for good reason. SFD respectfully requests this Court to 
reverse the lower court 's decision and grant attorney fees and costs on appeal to SFD. 
Dated this _I_ of April, 2017. 
Angela R. Marshall 
Attorney for the Respondent/ Appellant 
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